We study the pro…tability of traders in two fully electronic, highly liquid markets, the Dow and S&P 500 e-mini futures markets. We document and seek to explain the fact that traders that transact with each other in this market have highly correlated returns. While traditional least squares regressions explain less than 1% of the variation in trader-level returns, using the network pattern of trades, our regressions explain more than 70% of the variation in returns. Our approach includes a simple representation of how much a shock is ampli…ed by the network and how widely it is transmitted. It provides a possible short-hand for understanding the consequences of a fat-…nger trade, a withdrawing of liquidity, or other market shock. In the S&P 500 and DOW futures markets, we …nd that shocks can be ampli…ed more than 50 times their original size and spread far across the network. We interpret the link between network patterns and returns as re ‡ecting di¤erences in trading strategies. In the absence of direct knowledge of traders'particular strategies, the network pattern of trades captures the relationships between behavior in the market and returns. We exploit these methods to conduct a policy experiment on the impact of trading limits.
Introduction
We study the pro…tability of traders in two fully electronic, centrally counterparty (CCP), highly liquid markets, the Dow and S&P 500 e-mini futures markets. In these markets, as any other, traders earn returns by buying and selling assets. Also akin to many other markets, there is a wide variation in trader returns. We document and seek to explain the fact that traders that transact with each other in this market have highly correlated returns. This pattern is remarkable for at least two reason. First, in the markets that we study, because of an automatic matching algorithm, agents cannot e¤ectively choose their partners so the correlation in returns cannot be due to social interactions or interpersonal connections. Second, the observed correlation in returns between traders cannot be attributed to the observed characteristics of traders. The central question of this paper is whether and to what extent using information on the interconnection between brokers' trades helps us to understand the trading outcomes. By doing so, we have some insight into the role of market structure in determining liquidity provision and in understanding shock ampli…cation.
The presence of a computer match-maker linking buyers and sellers allows us to identify, in a causal sense, the role of the network structure of contacts in shaping individual returns. In particular, to understand the relationship between the returns of connected traders, we use the structural properties of the entire network, i.e. all the actual (direct and indirect) connections present in the market. This helps us both to explain the correlation between linked traders, and also to understand the degree to which minor changes in the actions or outcomes of a single entity can amplify into a system-wide e¤ect. Approaches for the empirical estimation of network in ‡uences are widely varied in the …nancial literature. Some use instrumental variables (Leary and Roberts, 2010) , some use summary statistics of network characteristics (Ahern and Gai et al, 2011) . Unlike these, our approach capitalizes on the network structure itself to measure the properties of the system in a recursive manner.
Our analysis is motivated by the following simple fact. We …nd that standard least squares regression methods using observable characteristics of the markets and traders are able to explain less than 1% of the variation in trader-level returns. When we expand the toolset to include the network patterns of connections, the regressions are able to explain more than 70% of the variation in returns. Indeed, observationally equivalent traders that sit in di¤erent networks or in di¤erent network positions earn di¤erent returns. Our incremental approach makes this clear; while some trader characteristics are correlated with returns, considering the spatial allocation of traders into networks as an additional source of variation greatly improves the explanatory power of the regressions.
Following these results, we dig deeper into our modelling approach and provide an estimation of how much a shock can be ampli…ed and how widely it can be transmitted as a function of the network structure of traders. The link between structure and shock transmission provides some guidance into how market structure can in ‡uence risk. In e¤ect, our empirical approach provides a short-hand for understanding the consequences of a fat-…nger trade, a withdrawing of liquidity, or other market shock. In the S&P 500 and DOW futures markets, we …nd that shocks can be ampli…ed as much as 50 times their original size and spread far across the network.
Why do networks matter for returns? They appear to have great signi…cance, even in these two markets, in which a computer assigns trading partners by price and time priority alone. We interpret the link between network patterns and returns as re ‡ecting persistent di¤erences in trading strategies. Without direct knowledge of traders'particular strategies, the network pattern of trades simply captures the relationships between behavior in the market and returns. While the link between strategies and returns is unobservable, a set of trading strategies intermediated by a computer can lead to a pattern of trades with correlated returns for connected traders.
Our study focuses on the analysis of the distribution of returns of traders in a single asset. Wide literatures exist that discuss the investment performance of individuals across portfolios, the price of individual or groups of assets, etc. 1 Another literature exists on the pro…tability of …nancial intermediaries, including specialists and trading desks. 2 By studying an individual asset across all traders, we can isolate the importance of …nancial interconnections. We contribute by suggesting that the pro…tability of trading is in ‡uenced by the particular market role, as described by the position in the network.
With the …nancial crisis and increasing concerns about …nancial integration and stability as a leading example, a large number of theoretical papers have begun to exploit the network of mutual exposures among institutions to explain …nancial contagion and spillovers. Allen and Babus (2009) survey the growing literature. From an empirical point of view, there is little guidance in the 1 In studies that include portfolio management concerns, the heterogeneity in returns has been attributed to costs di¤erences (Anand, Irvine and Puckett, Venkataraman, 2009, Perold, 1988) . Often the di¤erences are found to be explained by managerial ability in maintaining the persistence in returns over time. For mutual funds, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) , Bollen and Busse (2005) , and Busse and Irvine (2006) ) show that mutual funds maintain relative performance beyond expenses or momentum over multiple time periods. 2 Reiss and Werner (1998) suggest that interdealer trade occurs between the dealers with the most extreme inventory imbalances. So…anos (1995) disaggregates gross trading revenues into spread and positioning revenues and argues that, on average, about one third of spread revenues go to o¤set positioning losses. Hasbrouck and So…anos (1993) …nd that specialists are capable of rapidly adjusting their positions toward time-varying targets, and the decomposition of specialist trading pro…ts by trading horizon shows that the principal source of these pro…ts is short term.
literature on how to estimate the propagation of …nancial distress. 3 We contribute to this strand of the …nancial connections literature by providing an empirical approach able to measure carefully the pathways of spillovers in a market with a single asset. By peroviding details on the spread of risk and the sources of pro…tability at this level of disaggregation will help with an understanding of systemic risk and with the development of policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses data and institutional features of the markets that we study. Section 3 discusses the empirics of trader-level returns.
This includes a standard least-squares estimation as well as a network estimation approach. We also show how we can improve upon our baseline network regression model and elaborate on our estimation results to understand the di¤usion properties across the entire system following a shock.
We continue in section 4 to further highlight the role of network position to better understand markets and trader pro…tability. Section 5 discusses the causal nature of our empirical results and presents some additional robustness checks. Section 6 extends the work to implement a policy experiment on the impact of trading limits. We conclude in section 7.
Data and Institutional Features

The CME and Futures Markets
Our data of interest are the actual trades completed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
for two contracts, the S&P 500 and Dow futures. The trades we observe are the result of orders placed by traders that have been matched by a trading algorithm implemented by the CME. Using the audit trail from the two markets, we uniquely identify two trading accounts for each transaction: cash-settled contracts traded on the CME GLOBEX trading platform.
Because these two markets are characterized by the use of price and time priority alone in determining trading partners, the only phenomenon that generates networks is the pattern of trading strategies that links traders with each other. Particular patterns of trading will lead to di¤erent probabilities of being at the center or periphery of the network, and to distinct chances of trading with di¤erent types of counterparties. While for each period, we do not observe the limit order book itself, we know that transactions occurred because market orders or limit orders were matched with existing orders in the limit order book. We can then trace the pattern of order execution-a trading network. Figure 1 illustrates this pattern.
[insert …gure 1 here]
Empirically, we thus de…ne a trading network as a set of traders engaged in conducting …nancial transactions within a period of time; the presence of a link is simply a re ‡ection of the ex-post realization of a cleared trade.
The choice of the period of time within which a network is de…ned is important as it contains valuable information on the resulting network structure. Indeed, with more time, more transactions are formed and more participants can form accurate beliefs about the valuation of a given asset.
Our approach is to de…ne the network as a given number of transactions among traders that are either directly or indirectly linked. Then, throughout the remainder of the paper, we will use a range of network densities in order to ensure that our results are robust to this choice. More speci…cally, we designate a network as a sequence of consecutive transactions. What we will call 'sparse'networks are de…ned as containing 250 transactions, 'moderately dense'networks contain 500 transactions and 'dense'networks contain 1000 transactions.
While one could imagine alternate approaches, 4 our evidence supports the above choice, i.e. a de…nition of networks as a given number of transactions. Indeed, our results on the existence of network e¤ects are strongly robust when we vary the number of transactions. As well, the fact that we …nd our chosen network de…nition has enormous empirical salience suggests that we have chosen a reasonable concept for the network. In addition, there is no reason to believe that an incorrect choice of network timing would lead to the spurious …nding of a strong relationship between networks and returns. Indeed, the opposite is true; a randomly de…ned network will show no evidence of network e¤ects by construction.
The networks that we de…ne are distinct from one another over time. This occurs both because agents may not be active in each time period and because their transactions are matched by the trading algorithm in each time period. The observed network of realized trades is a potential tool to describe the (unobserved) strategic interactions at work in the market.
Returns and Descriptive Statistics
Consider a group of traders. These traders enter each day with a set of trading strategies. These strategies can either be formal or informal, automated or manual. Indeed, the market contains some of each of these. Among these formal strategies, for example, are algorithmic traders. These Of course, these correlated bidding patterns lead to similarity in returns. Because the matching algorithm used by the CME is blind to identities of the traders, traders with correlated strategies will trade with each other as well as with others. As they do so, and form links with one another, correlation in trading strategies leads to a connection between strategies and network position.
Many traders will acknowledge that sitting between two traders with fundamental liquidity needs can be pro…table.
Note that futures markets are zero-sum markets in aggregate. Thus, while each transaction could potentially yield a pro…t for both parties, some portion of the network must absorb equal losses for each gain. We illustrate how two traders could both pro…t from a transaction in …gure 2.
[insert …gure 2 here] Figure 2 shows the presence of two large traders (denoted 'A' & 'D') that have fundamental liquidity demands, one positive and one negative. Each of these participate in the futures market by placing large one-sided orders either to buy or sell contracts.
A separate set of traders, denoted 'B', implements rapid o¤ers to buy and sell. The objective of such traders is to provide the liquidity needed by the large traders with fundamentals demands.
Because the large traders may not appear on the market at precisely the same time, the liquidity providers can extract pro…ts from the large traders by being willing to transact when needed.
The combination of the liquidity traders'actions can generate a diamond-shaped network pattern illustrated in …gure 2, panel A. On one side, the liquidity traders buy as needed and on the other they sell as needed. By being willing to buy and sell, the agents in the center can generate pro…ts.
Of course, knowledge that agents can achieve these pro…ts leads to a new set of trading strategies. These examples help understand how returns can be correlated across trading strategies, but also importantly help illustrate how shocks can be propagated. That is, they are a representation of the pathways of the transmission of risk in the system.
Empirics of Trader-Level Returns
Traditional regression models
Assume that there are N traders divided in k = 1; :::; K networks, each with n k members, i = 1; :::; n k ;
In this section, we ignore the network structure of the connections. We simply use the network as the relevant "market" (or trading period) for each trader. As explained before, we consider networks as sequences of trading of 250, 500 and 1000 trades. Parsing trading activity in this way allows one to avoid variations in returns that may occur solely due to the ebbs and ‡ows of trading. We thus run least squares regressions including simple statistics of a number of relevant characteristics to capture aggregate variations of market conditions.
For each day or half day of activity (indexed by t), we evaluate the role of a range of control variables on returns. Our speci…cation is r i; ;t = 0 + 1 buyvolume i;k;t + 2 sellvolume i;k;t + 3 variance i;t + :::
(1)
f or i = 1; :::; n ; = 1; :::; K:
where buyvolume is the number of contracts purchased in the relevant trading period for each trader i (de…ned by network k each trader belong to) and similarly sellvolume is the number of contracts sold in the trading period. Recall that returns are calculated as mark-to-market value of contracts at the end of the day (or half-day). As a result, buyvolume does not always equal sellvolume during a particular trading time period. V ariance is the variance of a trader's return during the full (or half) trading day, volume is the net trading (buy-sell) aggregate volume in the prior time period, and laggedreturns is the trader's mean return in the …rst half of the trading day. This …nal variable only appears in speci…cations estimated on data from the second half of the day and captures potential persistence in returns. In all speci…cations, we also include a control for trades late in the day. 
Network regression models
Having seen that the OLS results of the above speci…cations do a relatively poor job of characterizing the distribution of returns, we look to augment our speci…cation to capture the information content of the network connections.
E¤ectively, we will augment speci…cation 1 with an regressor capturing the returns of connected agents. For example, to consider the in ‡uence on i of only a single other agent (j), speci…cation 1 would read
where x m denote the set of m variables considered above and r j denotes the returns of the trading partner. So an estimated coe¢ cient greater than zero indicates that returns for trader j are positively correlated with returns for trader i. Extended to a simple network of three agents (i; j; s) t t t i j s the equation expands to
where the subscript d and 2d indicate agents j and s at one node and two nodes distant from i, respectively. The coe¢ cient 1 captures correlation in returns between directly connected traders, whereas 2 the correlation between agents further away in the network structure. These multiple steps are important; they are similar in spirit to multiple lags in a time series regression. The set x m now also includes additional regressors for the characteristics of every other agent. Thus, as the number of agents increases and the network expands, we can continue to add additional regressors to the right hand side of this speci…cation for each agent and each degree of separation from agent i. Eventually, we will add n 1 regressors for each degree of separation, leading to a very complex speci…cation that takes into account each type of in ‡uence of every agent on every other.
To include every other agent and every degree of separation, and to simplify notation, we can introduce a matrix that keeps track of the links between agents. This is a N square adjacency matrix G = fg ij g whose generic element g ij would be 1 if i is connected to j (i.e. interacts with j) and 0 otherwise. Here g ij = 1 if trader i and j have concluded a transaction during a period of time, and g ij = 0, otherwise. This matrix represent the interaction scheme of the traders in the market. The G matrix associated with the simple network in the picture above is:
indicating that i trades with j; s with j; and j with i and s:
Then, we can collapse the above speci…cation with all traders at every level of interaction into the following simpli…ed one:
g ij; r j; + i; , for i = 1; :::; n ; = 1; :::; K:
where r i; is the idiosyncratic return of trader i in the network k; g i:;k = P n j=1 g ij; is the number of direct links of i, 1 g i:;k P n j=1 g ij; r j; is the average returns of trading partners, i;k is a random error term, x m i; is a set of M control variables at the individual and/or network level. This model is the so-called spatial lag model or spatial autoregressive model in the spatial econometric literature (see, e.g. Anselin 1988 ) and can be estimated using standard software via Maximum Likelihood.
The object of estimation is now . Table 3 shows the estimation results of this model speci…cation vis-a-vis the previous traditional one. We report the identical regressions as in Table 2 and the augmented regressions based on the network approach. It is striking to see the substantive improvements in …t coming from the additional regressor. Indeed, as we inspect the adjusted R squared coe¢ cients, we note that they are considerably higher than the OLS speci…cation. The additional information in trading partner returns is systematically important in predicting my own returns. The R squared coe¢ cients now range from .05 to .37 for the S&P and .04 to .18 for the Dow. In one case, these regressions explain more than 1/3 of the variation in trader returns.
[insert table 3 here] In terms of the coe¢ cient of interest, , the estimates for the S&P are between .02 and .27 depending on the day and the network type; similarly, they are between .02 and .10 for the Dow.
Most of these are estimated with a very high degree of precision. This suggests that increases in trading partner returns could be important for individual outcomes.
In order to highlight the relative importance of the network e¤ects vis-a-vis other possible controls, such as those included in the least squares estimation table 2, we estimate model (4) without controls. Table 4 shows the results. The coe¢ cient estimates for the network e¤ect, , as well as the values of the R squared are nearly the same as in table 3, suggesting that the improved …t of the regression is due to the network approach. The principle di¤erence that we observe is that for some speci…cations, the t-stats are lower than they were in table 3. This reveals that while the control variables do not explain much of the variation in returns, they absorb some estimation noise, allowing the network e¤ects to be estimated more precisely.
[insert table 4 here]
In the remainder of this section we will improve model (4) and elaborate upon this speci…cation to highlight the role of networks in propagating changes in returns across traders.
Weighted Networks
We extend the simple network model above to use the network equivalent of importance weights in an OLS regression. While the baseline network model had strong results, we hypothesized that the size of the transactions in the network would be a determinant of outcomes. Trading with large counterparties would be di¤erent than trading with smaller ones. We will measure the importance of traders by total trading value and replace the binary matrix G with a new matrix capturing both the number of links and the importance of each link. Let the matrix W = GD, where G is as de…ned above and D = fd ij g is a matrix that weights the links within the network. The scalar d ij is a scaling factor, calculated as the total trading volume in the same trading period (the network) of each i and j. Total trading volume is de…ned as the sum of all trades, both buys and sells, made by trader i with all other traders. As a result, W = fw ij g is now a weighted network w. [insert table 5 here]
All of the results are now stronger. First, note that the estimated correlation between trader returns is now greater than 0.9 in the S&P and greater than 0.8 in the Dow. That is, the returns a trader earns are very similar to those of her trading partners.
Second, across densities of network structure, we …nd estimates of that are large and always statistically signi…cant. Across each speci…cation, the observed t-statistics increase; the estimation is now much more precise than without the weights.
Third, these new speci…cations are able to explain a much larger fraction of the variation in the trader-level returns. The adjusted R squared values are now uniformly above 70% in both markets.
Both the structure of the connections and their importance are important in understanding returns.
The last row of is the aggregate amount won or lost by agents connected at any level to the trader. For example, an estimate of equal to 0:5 produces a multiplier of 2, suggesting that for each dollar lost by a trader hit by an exogenous shock, the individuals connected to the trader will lose an aggregate of 2 dollars. Because the market is a zero-sum one, if all agents are marked-to-market at the time of the idiosyncratic loss, the two dollar losses of the trading partners will be o¤set by two dollar of gains elsewhere in the network. Our measure is thus a calculation of the degree of re-allocation of pro…ts.
We report the value of below each speci…cation. We can see that the multiplier is between 16 and 66 for the S&P and 5 and 21 for the Dow. These large numbers imply that these trading networks have very high sensitivity to shocks. Small changes to one individuals rapidly spread and magnify. As it will be explained in greater detail in the next section, these e¤ects depends on both the structure of the connections and on the strength of the interaction, as captured by .
The average multiplier can be interpreted as a compact statistic for a type of systemic risk of a system. Indeed, the calculation of an average spillover following a shock de…nes the degree to which idiosyncratic losses become systemic ones.
Networks, Centrality and Pro…tability
Now that we have established the strong empirical relationship link between structure of a network and the returns of individual traders, we dig more deeply into the network structure to understand to role of the individual position in the network in shaping individual returns. First, we discuss one particular measure of network centrality, Bonacich Centrality (Bonacich 1987 ). This measure is simply a characterizatio that emerges from our network model and helps to provide a simple correspondence to returns. Second, we illustrate how this relationships between individual centrality and returns leads to measurable distributional impacts in returns.
Centrality and returns
Di¤erent measures of individual centrality have been proposed in the network literature (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). We consider here a particular measure, Bonacich centrality, which can be derived from the estimation of model (4) and has a number of useful properties. First, it measures the importance of each agent in a network taking into account not only the number of direct connections but also their importance in terms of number of connections in a recursive manner, so that the entire network structure is taken into account. Second, it is not parameter-free, but it depends on the level of strategic interactions that stems form the network, as captured by our parameter . Speci…cally, the Bonacich Centrality is a count of the number of all direct and indirect paths starting at node i and ending at node j, where paths of length p are weighted by p . Recall that this was how we compressed the large number of variables into a simple speci…cation, (4). More paths from i to j imply a more central trader. A full description of the Bonacich measure, including the connection with our model (4), is contained in Appendix A.
To illustrate the idea and its relevance to a trading network, consider the original Bonacich (1987) example. Bonacich considers a network of individuals that communicate with each other.
The parameter measures the probability that a communication will be transmitted by any individual to any of his contacts. W is the expected number of these communications that are passed on to direct contacts, 2 W 2 are the ones passed on to contacts two links away and p W p is the expected number of messages that reach agents at path-length p:
In the context of a trading network of mutual exposures, the magnitude of , combined with the network structure W each trader is embedded in, thus re ‡ects the degree to which a shock is transmitted locally or to the structure as a whole. Small values of heavily weight the local structure, while large values take into account the position of agents in the structure as a whole (Bonacich, 1987) . We include an illustrative …gure 4 that shows the impact of a shock to a trader in networks with di¤erent values. One can see that as becomes larger, the shock transmits more widely across the network, i.e. it impacts traders much further away in the network.
[insert …gure 4 here]
To understand the link between network topology and returns, we can use our estimated to calculate the Bonacich centrality for each trader in our networks (formula 7 in appendix A). 5 With this distribution of positions in the network, we can look at the outcome di¤erences across traders of di¤erent centrality levels. We do so by looking at the impact of a one unit change in centrality on returns. Table 7 reports both the standard deviation of the centrality measure as well as this impact for sparse, moderately dense and dense networks. 6 We report absolute changes in returns; because the benchmark return is 1, the numbers can also be interpreted as percentage changes. They are changes in returns over a one-day time periods. We do not normalize to an annual basis. It appears that high returns are associated with high degrees of centrality irrespective of network complexity.
[insert table 7 here]
We note two patterns. One, the standard deviation of the centrality measure is nearly identical across the three network types; indeed, it's relatively similar across markets. Two, the impact of a one unit change (approximately 1/3 of a standard deviation), is also relatively constant across network densities.
We highlight this …nding as it suggests, in part, that our network de…nition is e¤ective. Even though we construct our networks based on an ad-hoc choice of transactions, the impact of the networks that we de…ne remains consistently important throughout the measured time period.
While one could potentially improve upon the de…nition, the strength and consistency over time of these …ndings suggests that we have captured a large portion of the network e¤ect.
Taken as a whole, this evidence indicates that the number of direct and indirection connections in the network, as weighted by , is a relevant factor that plays a role in explaining the crosssectional variation of returns.
Network structure and distributional e¤ects
Our analysis so far shows to what extent network position (network centrality) of an individual trader was important in explaining the level of individual returns. The more central a trader emerges from the exogenous matching process, the higher his returns.
In the remainder of this section, we highlight the implication of di¤erences in network structures in terms of the distribution of outcomes in …nancial networks. That is, is there a di¤erence in the variance of returns for traders operating in di¤erent types of networks?
Recall …rst a few stylized facts. One, we …nd that network structure very well explains individual level returns. Two, we …nd that the average multiplier, as measured by the ratio of an aggregate impact to the level of an individual shock, is very high in the networks that we analyze. Three, we …nd that an improvement in terms of centrality for an individual trader is associated with a positive change in returns.
Given these three …ndings and the fact that futures markets are zero-sum, we can make two claims. First, at the level of a network (250-1000 transactions), we should see that a change in the distribution of the centrality measure should have no change on the mean return in a network.
That is, an arbitrary re-allocation of individuals around the network should change the distribution of outcomes, but not the mean. 7 Second, it thus follows that one should …nd di¤erences in the variance of returns. We …nd evidence of these two phenomena in our data. Figure 5 displays the results. It relates the impact of network centrality to the variance of returns in the network, and …nds a positive relationship. It also shows that the aggregate mean 7 We discussed above that the unweighted mean of returns at the network level may not always be one, given that some traders earn large pro…ts. Precisely, the re-allocation can impact to a small degree this unweighted return, but cannot impact the weighted network returns-which must always be equal to one.
of returns remain roughly unchanged. As centrality becomes more important, the distribution of returns widens. This is a logical implication; if being central leads to greater returns, in a zero-sum market, this necessarily means that someone at the periphery must lose out, and the variance of returns widens.
[insert …gure 5 here]
Technically, the relationship shows that the distribution of returns of the network with greater sensitivity to centrality stochastically dominates (in a second order sense only) the distribution of returns for a network with lower sensitivity to centrality.
Discussion and robustness checks
The validity of our analysis and its relevance for policy purposes hinges upon the correct identi…-cation of the network e¤ect, .
The core problem that emerges in estimating linear-in-means models of interactions is Manski That is, network e¤ects are identi…ed if we can …nd two agents in the economy that di¤er in the average connectivity of their direct contacts. A formal proof is in Bramoullé, Djebbari and Fortin (2009). As a result, the architecture of networks allows us to get an estimate of , while eluding the "re ‡ection problem." Of course, a complex trading network such as the one we are concerned with has a very rich structure of connections and identi…cation essentially never fails.
Another traditional concern in the assessment of network e¤ects in the social sciences is that network structure can be endogenous for both network self-selection and unobserved common (group) correlated e¤ects. The …rst problem might originate from the possible sorting of agents. However, given our de…nition of networks based on high-frequency data and a random matching algorithm, we have no reason to believe that any selection e¤ects exist in this context. Agents are assigned to trading partners as we described above, based on time and price priority alone. Even if two traders were to attempt to time a transaction as to ensure a match, the high volume of transactions on these markets makes this nearly impossible to complete. As such, we have a strong claim that individuals cannot choose their network partners and thus no selection e¤ects should be present.
Network topology is exogenous here. The possible presence of unobserved correlated e¤ects instead arises from the fact that agents in the same group tend to behave similarly because they face a common environment or common shocks. These are typically unobserved factors. For example, traders with similar training, that sit in similar rooms or use trading screens that show similar types of data, may be in ‡uenced in their trading patterns in ways that generate correlations in returns. While we believe this to be very unlikely, we can control for these unobserved e¤ects by re-estimating our model after taking deviations in returns with respect to the group-speci…c means,
i.e. from the average returns of (direct) trading partners. That is, if agents in a given empirically observed network have some similarity that leads them to earn higher returns as a group, we will average out this group-level e¤ect and look only for the presence of spillovers. Of course, our primary speci…cation already largely nets out market level returns by virtue of the fact that aggregate market levels returns are 1. In this case, we also control for group-level unobserved heterogeneity.
That said, there is little reason to believe that in an electronically matched market one would observe any e¤ect of this sort.
Results are in These results are useful also for another reason. The market that we are discussing is a zerosum one; bene…ts to a given individual are necessary re ‡ected in losses to another. As a result, complementarities in returns must necessarily be re ‡ected in losses elsewhere in the network. By estimating our results in deviations from average level returns for an individual's own 'network,'
we handle this issue. In deviations, complementarities will no longer be re ‡ected elsewhere in the network structure and we can consequently use our results to evaluate the impact of a shock to the system. The particular context of analysis and our approach thus enables us to uncover a causal relationship between network structure and pro…tability.
A Policy Experiment
One of the advantages of this approach is that it provides a mechanism via which policy makers and regulators can understand the impacts of their choices on the risk in the system. As a leading example, the August, 2010 passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) included a call for the evaluation of position limits in futures markets. The impact of such limits has been …ercely debated.
In this section, we construct a counterfactual study that explores the consequences of this policy using our framework. Our exercise runs as follows. We set an arbitrary transaction limit for a given period of time. Given the restriction, we re-estimate our model (4) assuming that any traders that, in the data, transact a greater number than this amount, transacted only the …xed maximum. Speci…cally, we restrict to C the number of contracts that can be purchased in 1/10 of a trading day, thus setting arti…cial bounds on the weights of our matrix W . This does not change the network structure other than the weights of the links. We consider C = f2; 3; 7; 10; 20; 30; 100g
for the Dow futures market and investigate the consequences of such limits in terms of the high returns are associated with high degrees of centrality irrespective of network complexity. estimate, b : Figure 6 shows the results for each of the values of C.
[insert …gure 6]
The simulation has two policy interpretations. First, we see from the …gure that tighter trading limits leads to higher average multiplier values. Above we noted that these multipliers can be interpreted as a measure of systemic risk; however, here some additional detail is warranted. In our context, systemic risk is a measure of the size of the passthrough that occurs following an idiosyncratic shock. This is conceptually distinct from increases in the frequency of shocks (which we do not address). What we observe from this exercise is that the size of shock propagation increases as trading limits become tighter. In the case explored here, a move from no position limits to a strict one would increase the systemic risk multiplier in the system from approximately 13 to 16.
Second, we can also infer from the exercise that tighter limits distribute the impact of the shock across a wider range of market participants. That is, while a shock in the constrained world may be widely distributed, an equivalent shock in the unconstrained world to a large trader may pass to only a small number of counterparties. This phenomenon arises because in our experiment we do not simulate new links between traders, the mechanism by which systemic risk increases is to decrease the centrality of the network; that is, it downplays the importance of the traders who had previously exceeded the limit and been quite central.
E¤ectively, this highlights that the policy comes with a distinct tradeo¤. One one hand, in our simulation, it has the potential bene…t of dispersing adverse shocks to a wider range of market participants. On the other hand, the limits also appear to generate aggregate larger consequences from each shock. The …ve dollar loss may now be magni…ed to 6 or 7. The trade o¤ of the two will determine the aggregate impact of the policy and its …nal impact will undoubtedly be market speci…c.
Conclusions
Our analysis explained a conjectured but to date unproven feature of …nancial markets: returns from trading are correlated with the position agents occupy in a trading network. Using our network-based empirical strategy on two highly liquid …nancial markets, we are able to explain a large portion of the individual level variation in returns. This …nding has potentially large salience.
Most importantly, one of our results is that individual level shocks are greatly ampli…ed and spread in these markets: a one unit change in individual level returns can be ampli…ed even 50 times.
This implies very rapid propagation of shocks and little ability to avoid contagion. Because these results are a function of the network structure, these results point policymakers in the direction of potential interventions. Notice that the rapid spread and ampli…cation derives from the network structure; adjust the structure and adjust the speed of spillovers. This points towards interventions in the matching algorithm, potentially during times of anticipated crisis. For example, one could alter or eliminate most of the network spillovers altogether by concentrating trading into hourly auctions.
A long literature in sociology and economics would suggest that network patterns are important in non-market interactions based on a variety of plausible mechanisms. These include social stigma, information sharing, peer pressure, and more. The di¢ culty in translation of the methodologies developed in the social science to …nancial markets, particularly electronic ones, is that there is little basis to believe that any of the mechanisms are at work. Orders are matched at random by a computer based on time and price priority, leaving little room for social impact even if traders had a motivation to do so. Thus, our conclusions are statements about the empirical importance of the networks that emerge as a result of equilibrium order strategies. We …nd that these strategies not only lead to networks of note, but that an empirical mapping of the networks to returns shows important e¤ects.
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Appendix A: Spatial autoregressive model and network centrality
For ease of interpretation, let us write model (4) in matrix notation and derive the reduced form.
The following derivations are helpful to understand why model (4) captures recursively the network e¤ects at any degree of separation and the link with a particulat network centrality measure, Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987) .
Model (4) can be written as:
where r is a N 1 vector of outcomes of N agents, x is a N V matrix of V variables that may in ‡uence agent behavior but are not related to networks, G is the row normalized version of the G matrix which is used to represent average returns and is a N 1 vector of error terms, which are uncorrelated with the regressors.
Given a small-enough value of 0; one can de…ne the matrix
The p th power of the matrix G collects the total number of paths, both direct and indirect, in the network starting at node i and ending at node j: The parameter is a decay factor that scales down the relative weight of longer paths, i.e. paths of length p are weighted by p . It turns out that an exact strict upper bound for the scalar is given by the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of
G (Debreu and Herstein, 1953).
In a row-normalized matrix, such as the one used in model (4), the largest eigenvalue is 1. If j j < 1 expression (6) is well-de…ned, that is, the in…nite sum converges. The condition j j < 1 capture the idea that connections further away are less in ‡uential than direct contacts and guarantees that the matrix [I G] 1 is able to capture all the e¤ects that stems from a given network topology, that is the cascades of e¤ects stemming from direct and indirect connections.
If j j > 1, the process is explosive. In a …nancial network context, it is equivalent to a complete …nancial collapse. While interesting in its own right, we do not analyse this case here. We focus on how, even in the absence of a complete …nancial collapse, a small shock can cascade causing large, measurable and quanti…able damage. Therefore we consider j j < 1.
If one solves for r in model (5), the result is a reduced form relationship: 1 is well-de…ned and non-negative. The vector of centralities of parameter in g is:
The centrality of node i is thus b i (g; ) = P n j=1 m ij (g; ), and counts the total number of paths in g starting from i. It is the sum of all loops m ii (g; ) starting from i and ending at i, and all outer paths P j6 =i m ij (g; ) that connect i to every other player j 6 = i, that is:
By de…nition, m ii (g; ) 1, and thus b i (g; ) 1, with equality when = 0.
Therefore, once one has on hand an estimate of it is possible to derive the distribution of Bonacich centralities for all the agents in the network. Observe that in the original Bonacich (1987) paper, the centrality measure is presented for unweighted networks. However, all the techniques apply to the weighted network case, i.e. G = W (see Newman, 2004 , for a discussion). Matching Engine Figure 1 Note: Each node in the section labeled 'order strategies' represents a single trader's plans for trading. The ovals beneath each trader, next to the label 'order submissions' represents actual placed order. Below this, we denote with a box the complete order book. This is the aggregation at each point in time of all the orders submitted by traders. This order book is passed through the box beneath it, which we have labeled a 'matching engine'. This computer matches orders based on price and time priority. Finally, beneath the matching engine, we provide a sample representation of the network patterns that could emerge from a set of 6 completed transactions. Note: The top figure shows the relationship between a one-unit change in centrality and the mean of returns in the network. To calculate this, we take the average impact of a one-unit change across all traders in a given network and plot it against the mean of returns across traders in the same network. The bottom figure shows the relationship between a one-unit change in centrality and the variance of returns in the network. To calculate this, we take the average impact of a one-unit change across all traders in a given network and plot it against the variance of returns across traders in the same network. Note: Panel A shows results from the S&P 500 futures market. Panel B shows results from the Dow futures market. Each of the two panels shows three sets of results from the estimation of a least squares specification. The dependent variable in each case is the returns of an individual trader during a window of trading. The columns distinguish between different windows of time; 250, 500 and 1000 trades for the market as a whole. For each market and each network density, we report the OLS estimation results over 21 days. T-statistics are reported below each coefficient estimate. Below, we report the adjusted R squared value from each specification. We include control variables for sell and buy volume during trading window, variance of returns for trader prior to trading period, volume in prior trading period, returns in the first half of the day, and an indicator for the final 2 periods of each day. We denote significance of coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Panel A Note: Panel A shows results from the S&P 500 futures market. Panel B shows results from the Dow futures market. The columns distinguish between different levels of network structure complexity. Each of the two panels shows three sets of results from the maximum likelihood estimation of model (4) . For each type network density and each market, we report the range of estimation results across 21 trading days. The first row shows the estimates of the parameter θ, the network effect coefficient, from the above specification. T-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates. We denote significance of coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively.
Sparse Networks Moderately Dense Networks Dense Networks
Panel A (1) . The columns distinguish between different levels of network structure complexity. This table uses a weighted matrix W defined as the element-by-element product of the adjancency matrix of realized trades and the sum of trading volume. For each type network density and each market, we report the range of maximum likelihood estimation results across 21 trading days. The first row shows the estimates of the parameter θ, the network effect coefficient, from the above specification. T-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates. Below, we include the adjusted R squared value from each specification and the average systemic risk multiplier. This multiplier is total network impact of a one unit shock to an individual. Averaging across the impact for all individuals in the network produces this number, which is equal to φ=1/(1-θ). We denote significance of coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively. Table 2 used the individual level gross returns. Here we use the deviation in returns from the average return at the network level in each time period. The adjacency matrix of realized trades is a symmetric, non-directed matrix of 1's and 0's with 1's indicating the presence of a trade and 0 the absence. For each type of network density and each market, we report the range of maximum likelihood estimation results across 21 trading days. The first row shows the estimates of the parameter θ, the network effect coefficient, from the above specification. T-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates. Below, we include the adjusted R squared value from each specification and the average multiplier. This multiplier is total network impact of a one unit shock to an individual. Averaging across the impact for all individuals in the network produces this number, which is equal to 1/(1-θ). We denote significance of coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1% levels with ***, **, and *, respectively. 
